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The saga of the Chinese spy balloon floating over the United States dominated media attention last week, and the destruction by the US seemed to be a signal moment in the relationship between the two superpowers.
It’s been a tense few months. Before the balloons stopped, Washington took major steps to expand its military presence around mainland China. The US and the Philippines announced a deal that allows the American military to use four more bases in the Philippines. It is the latest move by Washington to build up its defense position in the Asia-Pacific, the site of the most likely confrontation between the two.
The agreement with the Philippines followed last month’s announcement by the US and Japan that they were scaling back American troop presence in Okinawa along with several other defense measures, as the country’s top diplomats and military officials condemned Beijing’s aggressiveness in the South China Sea.
And in September 2021, Washington agreed to provide Australia with nuclear-powered submarines as part of the new AUKUS defense alliance that includes Australia, Britain, and the US. The security partnership also includes cooperation in cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and quantum computing.
Meanwhile, Taiwan, which China claims as part of its historic territory, remains the biggest point of conflict between the two countries. Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit there last summer prompted hostile rhetoric and unprecedented defensive maneuvers by Beijing near the island, and the People’s Republic has increased military flights around Taiwan in recent years.
So how dangerous is the situation in the Asia-Pacific? To find out, I spoke with Jeremy Mark, a senior fellow at the GeoEconomics Center of the Atlantic Council, a think tank in Washington. Mark was previously a reporter for CNBC Asia and the Wall Street Journal, and he has lived in Singapore, Taiwan, and Japan. A transcript of our conversation follows, edited for length and clarity.
Michael Bluhm
How is the situation in Asia-Pacific?
Jeremy Mark
The situation is a bit volatile, but I don’t think it’s a powder keg.
In the last decade, in particular, China has taken actions that have created unusual volatility in the region since the Vietnam War. China has harassed and intimidated Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. On its border with India, Chinese provocations in the past two years have left soldiers dead. All this indicates a significant escalation of tensions.
That said, I don’t think there is any regional or US-China conflict. Trade and business continued. Supply chain integration between China and its trading partners remains very deep.
China is currently busy with its own economy due to the impact of Covid, the real estate slump, high youth unemployment, and several other issues. This is not a country that will jeopardize its future by launching a war.
Michael Bluhm
What are the possible consequences of a Philippine base for regional security?
Jeremy Mark
The US sees positive consequences. There must be a hole in the US regional defense against China – which is now filled with this agreement.
It is also a message to China that provocative actions have resulted in the Philippines returning to the pro-American position it once had in regional security arrangements.
But from China’s point of view, this increases volatility. The presence of US forces in the northern part of the Philippine island of Luzon – the island closest to Taiwan – could lead to further tensions in some situations.
Michael Bluhm
This agreement is just the latest in a series of new defense ties with countries in the region, such as the new agreement with Japan and the AUKUS submarine agreement. How do you see Washington’s strategy here?
Jeremy Mark
I would add to last week’s announcement of technology exchange between the US and India and some other, smaller arrangements. All underscore the deep concern across Asia about China’s posture.
In the last 10 years, Japan has radically changed its approach to military policy. He even amended the constitution to give greater powers to the Self-Defense Forces, allowing for a higher level of defense against China. Australia has concerns about China’s actions regarding Australian exports and in the Solomon Islands, and Canberra’s decision to acquire nuclear submarines reflects these concerns.
All this adds up to a strong consensus among Asian countries that greater cooperation with the US – and each other – is needed to deal with China.
Michael Bluhm
Let’s look at China’s perspective. How do you see China’s strategy in the Asia-Pacific?
Jeremy Mark
Much of China’s strategy is directed inward. The Chinese Communist Party, before and during the Xi Jinping era, is experiencing a crisis of legitimacy. Xi has dealt with this in a variety of ways, including a crackdown on corruption after he came to power. The Chinese government has used nationalism – and the threat from the US, in particular – to galvanize public opinion, and they have been very effective.
More broadly, China sees itself as a rising power. The rhetoric portrays the US as a declining power, and says the time has come to redefine China’s place in the world order.
China clearly sees the importance of carving out a regional sphere of influence with China at the center – and using the development of its economic and military power to reduce US influence in Asia. China’s military, which has gained tremendous power under Xi Jinping, is increasingly taking advantage of this to push for a more confrontational defense policy.
Michael Bluhm
You have said that you do not see an invasion of Taiwan or a war in the region. A Chinese spy balloon flight over the US last week heightened tensions between the two countries. How might this event affect the dynamic between the two powers?
Jeremy Mark
Xi and Biden met in Bali a few months ago and tried to work out a way to keep the relationship alive. Secretary of State Blinken’s planned visit this past weekend will be part of that process. The balloon incident had clearly slipped [that].
Ideally, both governments can move beyond this and continue discussions to find ways to limit these incidents. But there is an amount of uncertainty, in large measure because of the political outcry in Washington and the increasing reaction in China to the US taking down the balloon.
Michael Bluhm
How dangerous is the situation around Taiwan?
Jeremy Mark
It’s certainly dangerous, but I don’t see an imminent invasion. I don’t think China has the military capability to attack such an invasion. China is well aware of the potential damage to its own economy and its place in the world from an invasion. Sanctions in case of invasion will definitely hurt China.
That said, China can take action against Taiwan, the most obvious example of which is a serious economic blockade. We saw gestures in that direction last summer. But overall, this is less of an action that will disrupt the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.
You have to remember that China is very dependent on Taiwan for technology, such as semiconductors. Taiwan’s investment is very important for China, especially at this time when China’s economy is struggling. Its economic foundations are often overlooked because of China’s threat to Taiwan.
Michael Bluhm
Let’s go back to other regional powers and talk about their perspective. How did Japan, Australia, and India handle the situation?
Jeremy Mark
Japan, India, and – to a lesser extent – Australia are countries where China’s bullying tactics have outdone themselves. Japan has completely shifted its core military policy because of China. Confrontation has taken place in the Senkaku Islands – uninhabited islands, occupied by Japan but claimed by China – and there joint Russian-Chinese naval exercises last year in the waters around Japan, and the event left no doubt in Tokyo that Washington’s interests were at stake.
India is no longer interested in deepening the Quadrilateral Dialogue, a diplomatic and military arrangement involving the US, Japan, Australia, and India. But due to the confrontation on the Sino-Indian border in the Himalayas, India is now actively participating in the Quad. Prior to the AUKUS submarine agreement, Australia was previously very cautious about alienating Beijing.
Countries such as Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar lean toward Beijing, and others try to maintain good relations with the superpower. Malaysia is a good example; Singapore allows the US Navy to use the port, but it also cannot anger China.
But overall, the main countries around the Pacific have decided to strengthen their relationship with the US.
Michael Bluhm
Does this change the balance of power between the US and China in the region?
Jeremy Mark
From a military point of view, China has become stronger in the last 10 to 15 years. The US alone will have a hard time confronting China militarily, but if you add the military capacity of Japan, South Korea, India, and Australia, China will face something much bigger.
But the US and China are economically dependent. The US depends on China’s manufacturing capabilities, and China needs the US market. China desperately needs US technology and finance because of its own economic difficulties and financial system.
These are closely interdependent countries – and China has significant dependencies not only on the US, but also on Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and others.
Michael Bluhm
Some have compared the US-China dynamic to the Cold War, but during the Cold War, the US and the USSR had decades of experience dealing with conflict, and had processes in place to reduce conflict. Do US and China have such a system?
Jeremy Mark
It is a serious weakness in the relationship. If you go back to 2001, when a hot-headed Chinese fighter pilot collided with a US spy plane in waters south of China, it was very difficult for the US to make contact with China’s leadership at the highest level. In the following years, efforts have been made to increase not only the crisis interaction but the working level interaction in different parts of the relationship.
The overall sense is that there is still a big hole in the relationship, especially in crisis management. Yes, diplomatic channels exist between the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the US State Department. At the highest level, we see the US president, national security adviser, and secretary of state interacting with their Chinese counterparts. But the whole network of working relationships is very thin. Nothing I’ve seen suggests that there has been significant improvement in developing processes to avoid crises.
If you don’t know how to talk to each other, how will you have a serious conversation when the chips are down?
Michael Bluhm is the senior editor Signal. He was previously an editor at the Open Markets Institute and a writer and editor for the Daily Star in Beirut.
Clarification, February 9 at 3pm: Updated to clarify that the Russian-Chinese naval exercise in the Senkaku Islands is not a confrontation but a planned exercise.
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