Eighteen months after the July 2021 anarchy, the identity of those who planned the widespread violence and looting remains unknown. The unprecedented incident claimed more than 354 lives and caused about R50 billion in economic damage.
Most of the dozens of arrests he made were supporters. Sixty-one people charged with crimes related to violence and arson recently appeared in court, with the state announcing it will also pursue terrorism charges. Bail for the accused has been extended until May 2023, suggesting that the wait for more revelations will be long.
But what is known about the July riots suggests that serious problems in policing and intelligence led to the wave of destruction. This is the argument of my latest working paper, Beyond Protest: Violence, Looting and Anarchy in July 2021, published by the Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection.
The paper shows that 17 months after this horrific incident, there is no sign of real progress being made to prevent widespread public violence.
The presence of a large security force outside Nkandla, the private residence of Jacob Zuma, on Wednesday July 7, 2021, was dispersed after the former president left for prison shortly before midnight on that date. On Friday 9 July, the main national roads in the north, south and mainland, and other roads in KwaZulu-Natal, were blocked, including for trucks.
On the same day, protests began in the central and suburban areas of Durban. By the end of the week, it had spread to Gauteng, facilitated, according to the report of the panel of experts next to the civil unrest of July 2021, by minibus taxis from KwaZulu-Natal.
In the province, violence and looting escalated over the weekend of July 10 and 11 and, in the first two days of the following week, occurred across the province.
The same modus operandi in different areas of KwaZulu-Natal, in a limited period of time, shows that the event was organized. Vehicles, mostly without number plates, and some with painted windows, arrive at the destination site.
The occupants came out with tools to break the locks, bars and gates, while urging others to join them. He left when the robbery began.
In Durban and Pietermaritzburg, crowds of people from nearby towns and shantytowns came on foot to bring whatever they could. Others came in vehicles to remove large items. In addition to looting, several malls and shops were vandalized, especially those that sell bulk goods to the poor.
In the North Coast town of Eshowe, where a small-scale farmer’s sugarcane plantation was set on fire, even a local bank was set on fire.
In the settlement of Phoenix, northwest of Durban, racial tensions between Indian and black African residents, and, in the end violence, including roadblocks and vigilante attacks, 36 people were killed.
Two historical legacies provide context for the events that took place in the large urban areas of KwaZulu-Natal. Durban was a typical apartheid city planned for four racial groups, with white residential areas closest to the city center and concentric circles of other racial groups providing a “buffer zone” separating white residents from black African towns on the outer fringes.
Historical events (which stem from the policy of apartheid) where Africans attacked Indians, such as the “riots” in Durban in 1949 and those in Bhambayi, near Phoenix, in 1985, are etched in people’s memories. In 2015, the Report of the Special Committee on Social Cohesion, established to investigate threats to social cohesion in KwaZulu-Natal, linked racial tensions in the province to economic problems and made recommendations to address racial grievances. This was never implemented.
The violence that erupted in July 2021 in Phoenix, which used to be a designated area for Indian residents and is surrounded by large African cities and informal settlements, is associated with people from these nearby areas passing through the suburbs (now) non-racial to rob businesses.
The fire was fueled by racial fear, a lack of constructive action by the local police, and blatant racism by drug-dealing vigilante gangs and rogue security companies with ties to the police.
The executive members of the government must take responsibility for what happened during the appointed days. Even without the intelligence, it was clear on July 9 that the police minister should ask the president to deploy the army to keep the roads clear and protect the infrastructure.
As the ANC held its national executive committee meeting over the weekend, it continued to insist that what was happening was a “normal” protest.
By the time South African National Defense Force soldiers began arriving on July 13, much of the damage had already been done.
The executive, and the parliament, are to blame for not carrying out the measures considered important in the 2018 report by the high-level panel towards state security, which recommended the restructuring of the security services and restoring the status of the State Security Agency as a civilian. supervisory body.
The high-level panel has made alarming findings on how constitutional principles have been violated as private sources have been converted to serve factional political and personal interests.
The Zondo commission’s report into state capture reinforces the high-level panel’s findings and is highly critical of the way the parliamentary watchdog over intelligence is dragging its feet on the right to enforce the necessary laws.
Both the executive and parliament have been blamed for the failure so far to take seriously the findings of the Zondo commission on the police’s crime intelligence division, including nepotism, corruption and the irregular operational involvement of ministers.
Those entrusted with the government have not explained why the recommendations of the Panel of Experts Report on Policing and Crowd Management, which was presented to the minister in 2018, have not been implemented.
These findings not only complete the reform and complement of public order policing, but also require the demilitarization and depoliticization of the police (as per the National Development Plan). Importantly, the expert panel report should also establish a police board to monitor appointments and promotions.
Action in this regard is particularly important given the routine nature of protests, and the way in which politicisation, nepotism and corruption in the police force became entrenched during the Zuma years.
The expert panel’s report to July 2021 presents a devastating picture of the lack of police preparedness for such incidents. The capacity of the operational response service is less than required, even under normal circumstances, and there is a lack of sufficient equipment (one water cannon per province).
The equipment available is not even properly maintained.
What happened in July 2021 is a product of how South Africa has become a state of criminalized power blocks: criminals operate with members of the secret service and senior officials, with political positions as a means of personal enrichment at the expense of good governance.
As of July 2021, there is no discernible political will to implement the necessary changes outlined in the report cited here, nor, in the midst of persistent socioeconomic disparities, has the important issue of social cohesion been addressed.
Raymond Zondo, the chairman of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, and now the chief justice, has warned that, without the actions recommended by the executive and parliament, state capture could happen again.
If we are to be protected from what the expert panel in July 2021 civil unrest described as “appetite for lawlessness”, the return of good governance must begin immediately.
This requires addressing the critical issues of policing and the failure of parliament to exercise proper oversight.
This article draws from research by the authors contained in the Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection (Mistra) working paper and a chapter contribution to a forthcoming research volume, Protest in South Africa: Denial, Reassertion, Reclamation (Johannesburg, Mistra), will be published in early 2023.
Mary de Haas is an advocate and activist for political and human rights, human dignity and social justice.