African multilateralism is in crisis – can the AU fix it?

The annual African Union (AU) summit will be held this week for the first time since 2020 without COVID-19 restrictions. It coincides with the fragile return to peace in northern Ethiopia, the resurgence of instability in the Great Lakes and the war in Ukraine, which continues to question the position of Africa.

At United Nations (UN) The Security Council’s paralysis over Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine represents a crisis of global multilateralism. While this observation rarely applies to Africa, several developments point to a similar crisis of African multilateralism.

This includes the failure to manage post-coup transition and impasse surrounding regional sanctions and suspensions regimeconfusion over AU vs regional bloc responsibilities and practical implications of subsidiary companyand the difficulty of regional security systems in dealing with violent extremism.

AU is the most representative international organization in Africa. Through consensus, it creates a way for countries to cooperate and set accepted norms of behavior. The capacity to provide pragmatic solutions to this week’s key summit agenda items will demonstrate our determination to fix the crisis of multilateralism.

During the summit, the AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) will meet to discuss the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). crisis and independent regional implication. This will be the first meeting of the PSC at the head of state level on the issue since 2016. The main challenge is to agree on the AU’s role in resolving the crisis without direct involvement.

In addition to the UN, mediation is currently dominated by the Nairobi Process initiated by the East African Community and the Luanda initiative launched by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. The PSC has a role to play in coordinating regional efforts, but some member states have a seemingly narrow conception of subsidiaries. As a result, the AU, especially the AU Commission, has been sidelined as soon as the regional bloc is involved.

Beyond the harmonization initiative in the Great Lakes, can the PSC create a consensual solution given regional tensions and competition? South Africa, which is hosting the PSC meeting, wants to reclaim the Great Lakes since the DRC joined the East African Community. (DRC is also part of the Southern African Development Community.) This will test the capacity of regional powers (Angola, Kenya and South Africa) to collaborate for peace and security rather than compete for influence.

Another challenge facing African multilateralism is the AU’s struggle to manage disputes between member states. Israel’s accreditation last year to the AU – which is subject to AU regulations – sparked fierce debate and division.

Consequently, the issue was excluded from the summit agenda, raising the question of how consensus can be reached in non-voting organizations. If the vote were to go ahead, roughly two-thirds of member states would approve Israel’s accreditation — showing how a vocal but influential minority can silence a less powerful majority.

Competition between countries for positions in the AU is a growing trend. It takes almost a year for the eastern region to determine who between Kenya and the last winner, Comoros, will take over the presidency of the AU in 2023. This year, the contest that will take place between Algeria and Morocco for the vice-chairmanship of the AU can. further undermined the organization and delivered an incomplete Assembly Bureau.

AU’s indecisiveness often leads to inconsistencies. This is symbolized by the participation of the transitional President of Chad, Mahamat Kaka Déby, in this week’s summit, although he did not take into account the commitment made to the PSC in 2021. The disagreement between the countries means that no communique was published after the last meeting of the PSC on Chad on November 11, 2022 .

The AU Commission has now reached its mid-term. Since the chairman will not run for a third term, what do the member states of the commission and the president want two years after the re-election of Moussa Faki Mahamat?

In 2022, he experienced two major setbacks – in the accreditation of Israel and Chad. He called for the suspension of the country after the transitional military regime violate of commitment to PSC.

The AU Commission chair has often faced headwinds from member states. However, the current international context is volatile and requests for a greater AU role call for a strong, not weak, commission seat.

Finally, it is time to interrogate the impact of the AU institutional reforms that began five years ago. While the whole process is frustrating, some reports point to poor morale among staff. So it is not surprising that many have joined the secretariat of the African Continental Free Trade Area in Accra, thereby undermining the AU Commission.

The merger of the former departments of peace/security and political affairs is one of the highlights of the reform. Has it improved the AU’s ability to manage and prevent conflict? The sidelining of the AU in the Great Lakes, the Sahel and Mozambique raises many questions, as well as the treatment of the Cameroon conflict.

Unclear and inadequate subsidiary practices also affect peace support operations. Recently, the troops sent by the East African Community to eastern DRC and the Southern African Development Community to Mozambique are the same. required at the regional level and only given after the fact to the PSC. This is different from the handling of Multinational Joint Tasks coerce in Lake Chad Basin and G5 Sahel Combined Forces.

The 36th AU Summit could be an opportunity to break the institutional and bureaucratic routine and overcome the potential crisis of the organization. 20 years after it was created. While the AU’s reforms are mainly about the body structure (‘hardware’), little has been done for the software, especially governance, peace and security.

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Reducing the AU Commission to a mere secretariat whose competence is regularly eroded by member states when their interests conflict is a sign of the organization’s search for its raison d’être. This does not bode well for African multilateralism.

Paul-Simon Handy, Regional Director of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) for East Africa and Representative for the AU and Félicité Djilo, Independent Researcher

(This article was first published by ISS Today, Premium Times’ syndication partner. We have permission to republish).